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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DUANE SOUTHWICK, I 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
S. S. MULLEN, INC., a Washington ) 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S RRIEF 
NATlTRE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10797 
'11his is an action for personal injuries, lost wages 
an<l medical expenses allegedly sustained by the plaintiff 
when pit>ces of flying cement struck his hand as he wit-
nessed the demolition of Stillman Bridge in Salt Lake 
County, rtah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury, which returned a 
verdict for defendant. This appeal followed a denial, 
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after h0aring, of iilaintiff's .l\Totion for .Tudg0111ent Not-
withstanding th<' YPrdict and in the alternatiw Motion 
for NPw 'rrial. 
PRELll\llN ARY srr ATEMENT 
rrhe partil'S will be designated as they appeared in 
tlw trial court. All references to the record are to the 
pagt~1' numbered in red and the typed numbers in the 
transcript of testimony and depositions are ignored. 
rr1w stafrnwnt of facts in plaintiff's brief, stated in 
a light most favorable to him and replrte with inaccurate 
and incornplet1, refrrencl·s, is not accepted by the dden-
dant and should not lw favorably considered by thi~ 
<'<>urt, in view of the rnlP reiterated in Reyn.olds 11• Tr. 
TV. ('lyde <f· Co., (195G), 5 Utah 2d 151, 20~ P. 2d :131. 
"Plaintiff presents h<'r case on a1ipeal by re-
c·iting facts tending most favorably to prove lier 
dairn. The oppositP approach must he adopted, 
and it hardly bears rPpeating that in a case likP 
this the factual situation will lw revewed on ap-
1wal in the light most favorahlP to tlw part~r pre-
vailing hPlow." 
Ddendant presents, in the following Statement of 
Facts, the evidence th<' jury reasonably could have be-
lieved and the infrrenc<'s which the jury could have fairly 
drawn tlwrefrom in arriving at its verdict. In re 
Ri.char,ds Estate, (195(i), 5 Utah 2d lOG, 297 P. 2d 5-±2. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant S. S. Mullen, Inc., contracted with thr 
State of Utah to construct during 1963 new highway ap-
proaches at the mouth of Parley's Canyon in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. In order to construct the new highways it 
was necessary that it demolish and remove from the can-
yon the old Stillman Bridge, a landmark located approxi-
mately one mile east of the mouth of Parley's Canyon. 
In the demolition of the bridge, constructed of steel re-
inforced concrete, it was necessary to use high explosive 
rhargPs. 
Realizing that destruction of the bridge would be not 
only spectacular but of considerable public interest, since 
it would mark the passing of a landmark from Salt Lake 
County, the Utah Department of Highways, through its 
information director, Chauncey G. Powis, advised the 
area news media as to the time the bridge would be de-
molished, expecting that newsmen would come to the scene 
at the appointed hour to observe and record the event (R. 
370). The newsmen were not invited to the area by de-
frndant or its employees (R. 370). Defendant did not have 
authority to exclude them from the area (R. 359) or 
dPsignate their position at the construction site. 
The plaintiff was assigned by his supervisor to 
cover the dernoli ti on story for his employer of seven 
)'Pars, the KCPX television station, so he traveled to the 
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an•a n(•ar tlw hridg<• in a car driv<•n by his wifo. Nh<· 
tlwn rl'turn('d to the city aft('r l<'aving him on U.8. High-
way -10 near Stillman Bridge. \Yhil(' at this location on 
tlw highwa:v, and lwfore going down into the bottom of 
the canyon b('low Stillman Bridge, the plaintiff had a 
conversation with l\lr. Powis, who d.rovP up in his car (R. 
277). At that tinw plaintiff discussed generally with Mr. 
PmYis what was going to happen in the demolition of the 
bridge and what the signals for the blast woul<l he (R. 
279-280). He was told by Pm,-is that tlw signal would bP 
given h>- so11w01w "-<'aring a rPd jaek<•t who woulcl lw \\'P:<t 
of t11<• hridg-<> (R :?7~l-2SO). 
Follo\\·ing th<' <·onwrsation with l\Ir. Powis, the 
plaintiff rod<' into tlw bottom of th<' canyon \\-ith a IW\\I" 
<·ollPaglw, Dav(' K ov<'llP, and. tlwr(' found two otlH•r iw"·s 
eollPagrn~s, Jeff Jordan and. l\like l\fillPr (R. 232-253). At 
that timP plaintiff infornwd .Jordan and ::\f ill('r of hi" 
eonvPrsation with Powis as to what th1• signals for tl1P 
blast wonlcl h<' (R. 277-78). Although ]llaintiff att('ll1ptP<l 
at the trial to claim that lw n•ciPv<'d this information l:'ll-
tin·l~- from Jordan and l\Iiller (R. 2G3), and although he 
ohviom;l~; adopted their statPnwnt that tlw signal ·was to 
hav<' hP<'n th<' waving oof a r!'d flag and "three whistles", 
tll<' tt•stimonv of all threP rwwsmen on this point was 
comp1Pt<'l>- cliscre<lit('(l h~· tlH• fad, later prown, that there 
\\·a:-: not <>Ven a whist!<' on tlw joh which coul(l have been 
usNl and suC'h a signal in th<' C'Onstrudion imlu:-:try is 
meaning-lr:-::-: (R :n~, :ri"S). 
\Vlwn plaintiff found Jordan and 11illrr tlwy were 
loeatPd near a ear which they had backed up on a short 
spur road whi('h was located on the north bank of the 
eanyon, a distance of 50 or so yards from tht- bottom of 
th<' canyon, toward the northwest. Dave N ovelle drove the 
car in which he and the plaintiff were riding up the same 
road and stopped it directly in front of the other car. 
Mr. N ovelle then apparently left the immediatP area of 
thP ran.:. 
At about this time Mr. George Anderson, power fore-
man for the defendant, finished loading the high 
l'xplosivt- charges on the center s1mn of Stillman Bridge 
and, liaving connPct0d the electrical leads to the charges 
and to the detonator, got into his truck to make sure the 
an•a was clear lwfore giving the signal to set off tlw 
hlast. Ile travt•led down the canyon too a point immedi-
atPly south and 15-20 yards below the point where the 
two ra rs were parked and the plaintiff, Jordan and Miller 
\H'n• located and stopped to talk to them (R. 329-330, 347, 
:l/7 line 2~)). He told them that the area they were in was 
not as safe as it might be and offered to give them a ride 
up onto the highway where they would be safer and where 
tlwy would get lwtter pictures (R. 329-330, 347, 378, 379) . 
. \ t that time he also explained to them that as the signal 
for tlw blast he \\'ould wave his hat to another employee 
of <ll'f Pndant, Don Noe, who would be located near a steel 
slttwk in the bottom of the canyon and, upon Noe's 
avk110\\·lrdg-0ment of the signal, lw would yell "fire" and 
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Noe would dPtonate the explosives (R. 330-331, 349, 378). 
rrheir reaction to Anderson's suggestion was that tlwy 
would take their chancC's where they were rather than 
move and they ·would gPt hehind their car (H. 3i~O, 3±9, 
:ns). 
Having thus attempted to aceommodate the nC'wsmen, 
including tht> plaintiff, by asking them to move fur-
tlwr from the bridge and offering to take them up on 
the highway, and having no authority to compel them to 
move to a saf Pr location, Anderson turned his trnrk 
around and traveled up onto U.S. Highway 40 above the 
position where the newsmt>n were located. After checking 
tlw arPa generally and looking to see that the newsmen 
were not in an exposPd position (R. 339, 351, 368, 289), 
hP gave the signal prPviously indicatC'd for thC' blast to he 
SPt off. 
ThP ensuing blast causPd eoncrete to fly as was to he 
Pxpected and a piPcP struck plaintiff on the hand as hP 
stood at the WPst end of the lot with his elbows resting on 
the top of the car so as to support the camera in his hand. 
The blast went about as expected in regard to intensity 
and effect (R. 292, 307, 3G+, 373). Althhough plaintiff 
elaims to have heen surprised wh('n the blast went off, it 
is significant that the signals \wre ch•arly obsPrved and 
heard hy ho th J anws DPaton ( H. 2S7-2SS) and 1\1 r. Powis 
(R. 373) even though ho th of them wt> re considerably 
further away from Anderson than was tht• plaintiff. Also, 
7 
plaintiff admitted having heard someone yell just prior 
to the blast (R. 258). In any Pvent, even though plaintiff 
elaim that def Pndant owed him a duty to advise him more 
dd'initely as to the signals, it was obvious that it would 
hav<~ made no diff erenct> insofar as his injury was con-
c0rned because the position of his arms and hands would 
have hPen the sanw in either event (R. 332). 
At the trial the plaintiff and his news colleagues, 
.Jordan and Miller, all admitted that their job as newsmen 
ofb"n required their presence in unusual places and that 
they were expected to witness and record news events 
which oftPn involved considerable risk (R. 206, 233-34, 
270-71). Bt>causP of the public interest in events such as 
tlw demolition involved in this case the newsmen, as is 
customary, were given special consideration and special 
privilPges in the area not accorded to members of the 
µyiwral public. At the time of the explosion, traffic was 
~topped along U.S. Highway 40 at a point approximately 
800- 1000 feet to the east of the bridge ( R. 315) and at a 
point approximately one-quarter of a mile west of the 
hridg-P (R. 323) and the only persons in the area, except 
for Noel Anderson who had come from Murray, Utah, to 
olrnt>rve the blast his father was in charge of, were the 
eon~truction crew members who were doing the con-
~trnction work and the newsmt>n. 
ARGUl\IEN1' 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE 
QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE TO THE JURY. 
A:::; his first ground of rPvPrsal the plaintiff claims 
that from the Pvidence all rf'asonable men "must find that 
defendant (and presumably the plaintiff himself) knew 
that (plaintiff) ____ wa:::; in an area of dangPr" and that as a 
matter of law "<l<>f Pndant is rPsponsible undPr the rule of 
absolute liability for the damages" suffered by the vlain-
tiff. Howc>ver, the casP of RolJison 1'. Robison, (1964), 5 
Ptah 2d 17 4, 299 P. 2d 124, ritt•d by plaintiff, rh•arly sup-
port:::; the position taken by tlw lowPr rourt ratlwr than 
tlH• position of plaintiff on this appeal. 
ln tlw Rof,i.son ease, a:::; in thP lll"<'Sent casP, tlw blast-
ing oeeUIT!'d in a location far remowd from any inhabited 
area and tlw only persons pr!:':::;t>nt werP iwrsons engaged 
in the construction work and onlookers. In neither case 
did thP blasting presPnt a hazard to persons normally re-
:-1icling in the area or to structures tlwretofore constructed 
upon thP ]and. In both cases tlw persons present at the 
scene rPalizPd generally what was to he expected ·when 
high explosiV('S are used and that flying rodrn and debris 
might prP:-:ent a dang('J' to thos(• rn•arh)r. In both casPs tlw 
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spectators retreate>d a distance from the location of the 
blasting to observe the blast. In each case a sepectator 
was injured by flying debris which was propelled by the 
Pxplosion directly to the spectator as might be expectPd. 
1This court there held that the rule of strict liability 
did not apply noting in language particularly applicablP 
to the present case: 
"Plaintiff relied on allegations of negligence 
and also upon the rule of absolute liability: that 
one who uses or is responsible for a dangerous 
instrumentality is absolutely liable for any re-
sulting damage. Whether dynamite is such a 
dangerous instrumentality depends upon the cir-
cumstances. Used in a crowded city, it of course 
would be; whereas, using it on a remote area 
u·here there is little or no possibility of injury to 
othrrs, it would not. In doubtful situations be-
tween those extremes the problem must be re-
solved by the answer to the question as to whether 
the user should reasonably foresee th.mt others 
might be injured. It is to be observed that even 
where the circumstances justify its application, 
this so-called rule of absolute liability has the 
weakness of most generalities. There are almost 
always exceptions which prove them fallacious. 
A commonly used example is the application of 
the rule to the keeping of a wild animal, such as a 
chained bear. But if the person injured has de-
liberately teased the animal, or been so reckless 
of his safety as to practically invite injury, he 
cannot recover. It will thus be seen that the so-
called rule of 'absol1de liability' is not absolute 
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at all. Both thP proprit'ty of its application in the 
first instance, and an~· dPfrnses against it, are 
conditioned by tlw limitations imposed by the 
fundanwntal standard ~which p<>rvades all tort 
law: the couduct of the reasonalJle prudent mn11 
11wfrr the circwnstr111ces; and its procedural corol-
lary, that whenevt>r tlwre is dispute in the evi-
dPnc<>, or uncertainty therPin, as to wlwther that 
standard is mt>t, the question is for tlw jnry to 
d!'tPrmirn•." (T~mphasis addPd.) 
rrhus, plaintiff's contention that d0frndant should 
hP h<>ld strictly liable is not supported. It will be noted 
that in its instructions to the jury the lmw•r court follow-
ed tht> languagP of tht> Rol1ison casP almost verbatim. 
Thus in Instruction No. 19 tlw jury was told that the 
dPfendant was nPgligPnt if it set off the explosion at a 
time wlwn it ''should have reasonably foreseen that plain-
tiff might be injur<>d." FurthPr, in Instrudion No. 23 
the jury was instructed that "one who uses an explosive 
undPr such circurnstanc<>s that tlw user should rt>asonably 
forPS<'P that otlwrs might hP injured by use of said 
PxplosivP is liable for injuriPs eansPd by such use unless 
the injurPd party can lw said to havP assunwd tlw risk." 
Having hPPn so instructed, thP jury, by returning a 
verdict in favor of defendant nec<•ssarily found either 
that defendant <lid not violate thP standard set forth 
in tlw instructions outlin<•d ahovt> or that plaintiff as-
smned thP risk, or both. 'rh<'r<' was ampln credihlP evi-
dence to support such findings as to both }H'Opositions. 
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Plaintiff's claim that defendant, through its powder 
foreman, George Anderson, knew, as a matter of law, 
that plaintiff was in a position of danger when he gavP 
tltt· signal to blast, it is not only contrary to the finding 
of the jury which heard all of the evidence, but it is clear-
ly re hutted even in the lengthy excerpts from Anderson's 
testimony which are quoted in plaintiff's brief. From all 
of the evidence in the case, including particularly the 
testimony of Anderson, explaining fully the situation 
which then existed, the jury could fairly find, as they 
apparently did, that although Anderson felt the newsmen 
would have been safer had they gone up on the highway 
with him as he suggested, they, nevertheless, would not be 
Pxposed unduly to danger if they remained behind their 
car as they indicated they would do. Further, the jury 
could fairly find from the evidence, as they apparently 
did, that at the time he gave the signal to blast, Anderson 
lookt>cl and saw no one in an exposed position of danger. 
It is interesting to note that Don Noe, an employer of 
defendant, and at least one other newsman at the time 
of the explosion were located behind the steel shack in 
the bottom of the canyon which was a good deal closer 
to tlw blast than was plaintiff. Yet even at that close 
di1Jtance Mr. Noe was exposed to the debris from the 
blast (Defendant's Exhibit D; R. 312) and the person 
who took the photos of the blast (Defendant's Exhibits 
A, 1'J and D) from a position near the steel shack also 
was exposed to the debris from the blast for at least a 
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short period in order to take the photo of the blast. YPt 
plaintiff who was substantially further mvay, claims hP 
should have had more warning and more protection. 
Plaintiff's r<>liance upon Alvarado v. Tucker, et al., 
( 1954) 2 Utah 2d lG, 2G8 P. 2d 986, to discolmt the testi-
mony of Anderson clearly cannot be sustained. The rule 
of tlw Alvarado case has no application herP since that 
ease is readily distinguishable from both a procedural 
and a substantiw point of view. It cannot apply to strike 
from the record in this case those portions of Anderson's 
tPstirnony which plaintiff would dt>arly like to have omit-
trd. His testimon~' and his explanation of prior responses 
given in his deposition rnm1t lw considPred as a wholP 
hy this Court as it was hy tlw jury. And<>rson "'as at thr 
tiirn• of trial no long-t•r ernploy<>d hy defendant. There is 
no reason, legal or otherwise, to disqualify or disrf:'gard 
his tl•stirnony or an>' part of it as plaintiff claims. 
As Pven tlw l'XC<'rpts in plaintiff's bripf show, Ander-
son statPd rJParly and reppafrdly throughout his testi-
mony that tlw newsnwn said th<>y would stay behind their 
rar, that, althoug·h on<> cannot Pver be sure in blasting 
operations, hi' ff:'lt thPy would be reasonably safe if they 
stayrd behind thPir car, and that tlw~r were not in an 
Pxpost>d position of dang<>r insofar as 110 could tell whPn 
lw gaw tlw signal to hlast. CPrtainly from this testimony 
and that of others at 111(• sePrn•, the jury could fairly 
find, as thP)' appan·ntlr did, that at tlw fom• lw signalled 
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to sPt off the blast, Anderson reasonably believed that 
m•wsmen wen~ not in an exposed position of danger. 
This is borne out, moreover, by the fact that the plaintiff, 
by all accounts including his own, was standing so that 
the car was between him and the blast and the only ex-
posed parts of his body were those which he left exposed 
in ordPr to observP and record the explosion. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE 
QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY. 
As his second ground for reversal plaintiff claims 
that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence of assump-
tion of risk in this casP. His claim that the evidence is 
undisputed that he was not involved in any discussions 
with l\[r. Anderson, is clearly not true in view of thP 
testimony of Powis that "many or all of the newsmen" 
\\'Pre prPsent at the second conversation (R. 377), thP 
testimony of Noel Anderson that three newsmen were 
behind the car during the second conversation (R. 329), 
and their position was the same at the time of the blast 
(H. ;)32), and the testimony of George Anderson that 
tlm·e iwwsmen were behind the car (R. 332). There was 
thus ample evidence from which the jury could reason-
ably find that he was present and overheard the conver-
sation with Anderson. 
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Plaintiff's claim that h<> ,\-as complckly lacking in 
knowlPdgt> as to tht> blast or its E'ffrcts so as to preclud<~ 
assumption of risk as a matter of law is ahsurd. As 
pointPcl out above, tht>n' is ample evidence from which 
thP jury could find that he ovt'rh<'ard tlw "·arning, in-
structions and iw1ut>sts of Anderson. Ile admitted, more-
owr, in his deposition and at tlw trial not only that his 
.joh as a nPwsrnan necessarily involved a strong element 
of 1wrsonal risk in many situations, ( R 270-271) hut th!1t 
lw realized therP was dangPr in this Pxplosion. HP knt>w 
tlw hridg-<' "-as a large concr<'te and stf'el structure, that 
it was to lw demolish<>d with high explosives, and that 
explosives cause dt>bris to fly from tlw point of clPtona-
tion (R. 272-2/:3). Further he testified that he himself 
was stationt>d l1rh i·nd tlw car ( R. 2~);)) all(i tlw rock which 
('llUSt'd his injury cam<> <lirPrtl~- from tlw hridgP to his 
position as would haw hePn expected (R. 29.S). As the 
lowPr court noh'<l, this plaintiff cannot claim ignoran('e 
of tlw ohvious danw'rs which an~- adult would be aware 
of ( R 420). 'l'lw injury-, having result Pd precisely as 
<'onld havP h~·<·n pn~dict<>d, the qtwstion of assumption of 
risk was propPr1~- snhmitth-'<l to thP jmy. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUB-
MIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE THEORY OF ABSO-
LUTE LIABILITY. 
l;) 
'I'he trial court, as noted under Point I above, sub-
mitted this case to the jury based upon instructions pat-
terned almost verbatim after the Robison case. Actually, 
tlim;P instructions placed upon defendant a greater bur-
d<>n than it should have been required to carry but this 
is not something of which plaintiff can complain since 
tlwy wPrP unduly favorable to him. 
In order to find liability <Yn the part of defendant, 
tlw jury merely had to find that defendant "reasonably 
l'ould have foreseen plaintiff might be injured." In this 
connP<'tion, defendant submits that the test should have 
lwl'n whether defendant "reasonably should have fore-
SP<'n that plaintiff likely would be injured" or "probably 
would be injurf'd." Y Pt, notwithstanding this heavy bur-
dPn placPd upon defendant in these instructions the jury 
fnnnd in its favor. Plaintiff cannot complain of this. 
Plaintiff's claim that the court should have instructed 
on his theory of absolute liability is answered by the fact 
that this was not a proper case for application of that 
theory any more than it would have been a proper case 
for application of a theory of unavoidable accident or 
act of God had those been claimed by plaintiff. This was 
not a case of absolute liability and it would have been 
l'lTor for the lower court to have instructed on that 
thPory. 
Plaintiff\; claim that defendant was not entitled to 
nss<>rt the defense of contributory negligence overlooks 
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tkfrndant\.; ansv,·pr in which it was pl<·adPd as '"<'11 as th<> 
prPtrial ord<·r (R. :i-i) arnl his own answPr to d<'f Pndant\: 
Tnt<>rrogator~· ~o. Hi (R. 1;)). 
J t should lw not<·d that in this type of case the qnrs-
ti on, wlwthPr strict liability should apply or wlwther tlw 
conct>pt of neglig<>nce ::-;hould apply, is one for th<• court 
to dt>tPrminP. TPntativ<' Draft No. 10, ~520, R<>stakmt>nt 
of Torts 2d, citt>d '"ith approval in tlw Robison casP, 
provid<'s in Comm\'nt 1 that thP determination as to 
whetlwr an aetivity involws the conc<'pt of strict liability 
or tlw concl'pt of n<>glig<·rn·p is for th<> tonrt rathPr than 
tlw jury. 
Tilt> plaintiff and otlH•r 1wws11wn at tlw scPne of this 
d<>Jt10lition dPnwndl·d an<l l'Pt(•ivPd privil<·gr•s not accord-
t>d to 11wmlwrs of thP gPn<'rnl public. (\-'rtainly tl1P in-
tPrPst of" thP vil·wing public indicates that such a privi-
}pgp shoul<l h<> grnnt<'d in this typ<' of cmw. Having hPPll 
givPn this spPcial privih•gp, how<'V<>r, tlw plaintiff sr<'k~ 
h>' this app<>al to avoid th(• n•sponsihility involvf'd in 
PX<•rcising that privikge. Tf the contractor is found to hr 
ahsolutPl>' liahl(• in a ease of this kind it is obvious that 
PVl'l'Y pffort would lw <:~cqH•nc1('(1 in th<' future to Pxelll(k 
1w\\·srn<>n from tltP an·a. This wonk! lw a ddriuwnt to thl' 
\'i<'wing pnhli<'. Y<>t, if tlH• rnl<> 0f strict liability applie:;;. 
th<· contractor would ha\'<' 110 altl·rnativ<• s:1H·e it ga.iM 
no lwnPfit from thP pn·~<'l1<'\' of th<· lWWSllH'il. 
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CONCLUSION 
No claim of prejudice or impropriety has been made 
as to the court's conduct of the trial itself. The court's 
instructions are the target of plaintiff's attack. 
There is an abundance of support in the record and in 
applicable law to uphold the instructions given by the 
court as well as the jury verdict in this case. As has been 
noted, plaintiff has cited neither authority nor evidence 
which demands a different conclusion. Although there 
\rns evidence from which the jury could have found in 
plaintiff's favor under the instructions given, the great 
weight of the evidence, and the jury's verdict, were in 
favor of ddendant. 
Plaintiff had his day in court and the issues were 
found against him. He had his case fairly and fully pre-
s0nt0d to the jury. His many allegations of error are 
sn1)vorted neither in the record nor by the authorities. 
Tlte words of Justice Crockett in Hales v. Peterson, 
(19Gl), 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822, 825-26 are par-
ticnla rly appropriate here. 
"'.Ve have heretofore recognized the import-
ance of safeguarding the right to trial by jury. 
A necessary corollary to it is that there must be 
some solidarity in the result so that it can be re-
lied upon. To the extent the verdict can easily 
lS 
~w set aside by thP comt, the right to trial by jury 
is weakPned. In ordPr to givf' substanc(' to the 
right, once the trial has bc>en had and a verdict 
renderpd, it should not be regardc>d lightly, nor 
overturned because of errors or irregularities un-
kss they are of sufficient consequence to have 
aff Prted the rPsult. 
"Anyone acquainted with the practical opera-
tion of a trial by jury and the human factors that 
must play a part therein is aware that it would be 
almost impossible to complete a trial of any length 
without some things occurring with which counsel 
after thf' case is lost, can find fault and, in zeal 
for his cansf', all quite in good faith, magnify into 
error which to him and the losing parties sf'ems 
blameable for their failure to prevail. However, 
from the standpoint of administering evenhanded 
justicP the court must dispassionatPl,Y survey such 
claims against the ovf'r-all picture of the trial, and 
if the parties have been afforded an opportunity 
to fully and fairly present their evidencP and 
arg-uments upon the issnPs, and the jury has made 
its determination thPreon, the objertiw of tlw 
rroceeding has br'en accomplislwd. And the judg-
ment should not b0 disturlwd unless it is shown 
that there is error which is irnbstantial and preju-
dicial in the sPnSP that it a})Twars tlwre is a rea-
sonable likelihood that tl1P result \rnuld haw hePn 
<liff PrPnt in thP ahs<'n<'<' of such enor ... " 
This ap1wal is without llll'l'it. Thl' jnd{..,rinent should 
ht> affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, 
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
